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I. INTRODUCTION
After numerous failed attempts and massive lobbying efforts
largely by banks and credit card companies, the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 20051 was signed into law
by President Bush on April 20, 2005.2 The legislation represented the
largest overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code since its enactment in 1978.'
With this overhaul, Congress intended to improve the bankruptcy
system by curbing abusive practices among consumers.4 The revisions
to the Bankruptcy Code are marked by a restoration of personal
responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system.5 While the 2005
Act was driven largely by consumer bankruptcy, several significant
provisions affect corporations, farmers, and small businesses. 6 In
1. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in various sections of 11
U.S.C.).
2. See generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (Summer 2005)
(providing a comprehensive legislative history of bankruptcy reform beginning with the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission of 1994 and culminating in the 2005 Act). Prior
to President Bush signing the 2005 Act into law, on March 10, 2005, the Senate passed it by
a vote of 74 to 25. Id. at 565. The 2005 Act was then further approved in the House of
Representatives by a vote of 302 to 126 on April 14, 2005. Id. at 566. Most of the
provisions of the 2005 Act were effective on October 17, 2005, 180 days after it was signed
into law. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 1501, 119 Stat. 23, 216.
3. E.g., WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN & LAWRENCE R. AHERN III, 2005 BANKRUPTCY
REFORM LEGISLATION WITH ANALYSIS 10 (Thomson/West 2005).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 109-3 1, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
5. See id.; Press Release, White House Press Office, President Signs Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005), http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html (quoting President Bush's statement
before signing the 2005 Act).
6. See Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11:
The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603, 603-644 (Summer 2005) (outlining a
number of bankruptcy changes made by the 2005 Act); Craig Reimer, Congress Overhauls
the Nation 's Bankruptcy Laws, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, June 20, 2005, available at 2005
WL 9745980 (outlining a number of bankruptcy changes made by the 2005 Act).
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particular, commercial landlords are among the biggest winners of the
business bankruptcy changes.
7
In a reorganization case under Chapter 11, the debtor is
attempting to restructure and rehabilitate the operation of its business,
providing the debtor the opportunity to preserve all or part of its
prepetition estate. In return for this opportunity, the debtor commits to
making specified payments to its creditors over a period of time
postpetition, as formulated in a plan of reorganization. 9 Unless the
court orders otherwise, the existing management of the business
remains in place and serves as a debtor-in-possession ("DIP").
10
In many cases, a DIP will be the lessee on several, sometimes
even hundreds, of unexpired leases of nonresidential real property.l"
One of the major components of a successful reorganization in cases
which have a great number of leases is the determination of which
unexpired leases shall be assumed, and which ones shall be rejected. 2
Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the framework for
such decisions.13
By assuming an unexpired lease, the DIP is allowed to remain in
possession of the premises, but is obligated to make good on all past
and present payments due under the lease. 14 On the other hand, by
7. William B. Sullivan, Landlords Go For Broke, THE RECORDER (San Francisco),
August 15, 2005, at S13; see also Kelly A. Kulak & Allison Lange, Bankruptcy Reform's
Impact on Commercial Leases, Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code Should Prove
Beneficial to Commercial Retail Landlords, N.J. L.J., June 20, 2005, at S 10.
8. See generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 731-80 (West Publishing Co.
1993).
9. See id. at 756-59.
10. See id. at 737-38 (acknowledging that in most cases the debtor-in-possession will
operate the business after the petition is filed); In re Cukierman, 265 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that Cukierman, the DIP, had the duties of the trustee under § 1107(a) during
the relevant time of the Chapter 11 case).
11. See, e.g., In re Channel Home Centers, 989 F.2d 682, 683 (1993) (noting that "[a]s
of the filing date, Channel and Channel Realty were parties to about 200 leases at 91
locations in 19 states"); Company News; Wang Seeks Court's Permission To Terminate
Leases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1992, at D3 ("Wang Laboratories Inc., said it would ask the
Federal Bankruptcy Court for authority to terminate more than 115 unexpired leases for
various operations throughout the United States, which would save it $35 million in annual
rental expenses.").
12. See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1197
(1984) (acknowledging that the assumption or rejection decision is "vital to the basic
purpose of a Chapter 11 reorganization").
13. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (2000).
14. § 365(b)(1).
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rejecting an unexpired lease, the DIP surrenders the right to use the
premises, and also relinquishes further personal liability on the lease.'
5
The rejection of the lease is, however, a breach of the lease 16 and the
commercial landlord will have a general unsecured prepetition claim for
the damages it suffered as a result of the rejection.
17 Regardless of
which decision is made, in the interim period the DIP is required to
timely perform all of the obligations due under the lease.
18
The 2005 Act amended § 365(d)(4) significantly to the
advantage of the commercial landlord by addressing Congressionally
perceived problems over the past two decades. '9 This advantage,
however, may not only be realized by commercial landlords, but may
also benefit DIP lenders with the possibility of extending larger DIP
financing to meet a DIP's immediate cash needs upon filing for
bankruptcy.2° Part II of this Note discusses § 365(d)(4) before and after
the 2005 Act.2 ' Part III addresses the increased opportunity presented to
DIP lenders under revised § 365(d)(4) and potential pitfalls associated
with taking advantage of the lending opportunity.22 Finally, Part IV
highlights what DIP lenders can do to protect their interests when
lending to DIPs under § 364(b).23
II. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4), BEFORE AND AFTER
A. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4), as added in 1984
In 1984, Congress enacted the Leasehold Management
Bankruptcy Amendments Act,24 adding several pro-landlord provisions
15. E.g., In re Tri-Glied, Ltd., 179 B.R. 1014, 1018-19 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995).
16. § 365(g); e.g., McLaughlin v. Walnut Properties, Inc., 119 Cal. App. 4th293, 299-
300, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 369, 374-75 (2004).
17. § 502(g); e.g., McLaughlin, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 299-300, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
18. § 365(d)(3); e.g., In re Cukierman, 265 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 2001).
19. See Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 6, at 623-24.
20. See infra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 24-53 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 54-102 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
24. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 361-363, 98 Stat. 333, 361-64 (1984), as part of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified
as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The Act was enacted in the
face of generally perceived problems the prior Act presented to commercial landlords in
obtaining certainty over their leases. 130 CONG. REc. S 8891, June 29, 1984, reprinted in
2006]
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to the Bankruptcy Code,25 including § 365(d)(4), 6 a provision which set
out the time requirements for assuming or rejecting an unexpired lease
of nonresidential real property.27 With the addition of § 365(d)(4),
Congress hoped to reduce the period that certain leaseholds would
remain vacant and thus lessen the uncertainty commercial landlords
experienced while a DIP decided whether to assume or reject an
unexpired lease.28
With respect to unexpired leases of nonresidential real property,
the 1984 version of § 365(d)(4) provided a DIP a sixty-day decision
period from the date of the bankruptcy filing to either assume or reject a
lease. 29 If the sixty-day period elapsed and no decision was made on a
particular lease, then such lease was deemed rejected and the DIP had to
immediately surrender the property to the commercial landlord. 30
However, the bankruptcy court could, upon a showing of cause, extend
the initial sixty-day period for "additional time.' Oftentimes a court
not only extended the initial decision period for a specified time, but
extended it multiple times.32
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 590-606 (Statement of Orrin G. Hatch) (explaining the perceived
problems of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
25. S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576, 599
(acknowledging that one of the stated purposes of the changes made to § 365 by the 1984
Amendments was to "strengthen the protections [afforded] ... shopping centers under the
Bankruptcy Code").
26. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (2000).
27. Id. "Prior to the [1984] Amendments, there was no distinction in § 365 between
leases of residential and nonresidential property." Jane S. Solomon, Real Estate Aspects of
the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 29 (July 1986).
28. Allyson R. Abel, Whether to Assume or Reject a Lease - The Section 365 Dilemma,
7 BANKR. DEV. J. 125, 131 (1990) (citing S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-37,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576, 599).
[The] problem was caused by the ability of the trustee to close a store
for an extended period of time without stating his intention regarding
the disposition of the premises, thereby preventing the landlord from re-
leasing the space to an operating business. Consequently, landlords and






32. E.g., Reimer, supra note 6; Harold D. Jones, Substantial Changes for Corporate
Bankruptcy, 234 N.Y. L.J. 16, col. 1 (July 19, 2005); see also In re Adelphia Commc'n
Corp., 291 BR. 283, 292-94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining the factors to be used in
determining whether to extend a DIP's decision period).
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While Congress intended to reduce the uncertainty experienced
by commercial landlords, the 1984 version of § 365(d)(4) had the
opposite effect. 33 In fact, the practice of bankruptcy judges granting
multiple extensions to a DIP beyond the initial decision period
effectively gave DIPs the ability to avoid making decisions as to its
unexpired leases for months, even years, after filing for bankruptcy, to
the detriment of the commercial landlord.34 This practice essentially left
commercial landlords as forced lenders, compelled to obey the wishes
of DIPs indefinitely.35
B. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4), as amended in 2005
By amending § 365(d)(4) in the 2005 Act, Congress attempted
to put to rest the difficulty experienced with unexpired leases of
nonresidential real property.36 The revised section established a "firm,
bright line deadline" on a DIP's overall decision period, attempting to
cure the previously undesired and unintended result.37 When a debtor is
the lessee of an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property upon
filing for bankruptcy, revised § 365(d)(4) provides the DIP with an
33. See Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 6, at 623-24.
34. Kulak & Lange, supra note 7; see also Jones, supra note 32; BROWN & AHERN III,
supra note 3, at 97 (explaining that prior practice allowed debtors to withhold for years).
35. See Business Bankruptcy Reform Act: Business Bankruptcy Issues in Review:
Hearing on S. 1914 Before Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (May 19, 1998) [hereinafter Testimony of Ellen B.
Marshal] (testimony of Ellen B. Marshal, Manager, Economic Issues, International Council
of Shopping Centers); American Bankruptcy Institute, Hatch: On Assuming or Rejecting
Leases Under the New Law, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6, 6-7 (April 2005) [hereinafter Hatch].
36. See Testimony of Ellen B. Marshal, supra note 35. § 365(d)(4), as amended in
2005, states
(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), an unexpired lease of nonresidential
real property under which the debtor is the lessee shall be deemed
rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender that nonresidential
real property to the lessor, if the trustee does not assume or reject the
unexpired lease by the earlier of - (i) the date that is 120 days after the
date of the order for relief; or (ii) the date of the entry of an order
confirming a plan. (B)(i) The court may extend the period determined
under subparagraph (A), prior to the expiration of the 120-day period,
for ninety days on the motion of the trustee or lessor for cause. (ii) If
the court grants an extension under clause (i), the court may grant a
subsequent extension only upon prior written consent of the lessor in
each instance.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, § 404(a).
37. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 86 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 152-53.
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initial decision period of the earlier of either 120 days from the date of
filing or the date of the entry of an order confirming a reorganization
plan.38 On the motion of the DIP or the commercial landlord, the court
may extend the initial decision period for ninety days upon a showing of
cause.3 9 However, the section expressly limits the authority of the court
to grant further extensions to situations where the commercial landlord
provides written consent for any subsequent extension. n If a DIP fails
to either assume or reject its unexpired leases within the decision period
granted by the statute or by the court, a lease is deemed rejected and the
DIP must immediately surrender the property to the commercial
landlord.4 '
In revising § 365(d)(4), Congress addressed the problem of
allowing bankruptcy judges to extend a DIP's decision period
indefinitely. 42 In fact, this revision is designed to "limit[ ] the
bankruptcy judges' discretion to grant extensions of the time for the...
debtor to decide whether to assume or reject a lease. 43 In response to
the practice of granting indefinite extensions,44 the decision period was
changed from sixty days with multiple time period extensions available
to 120 days subject to a single extension of ninety days upon a showing
of cause, and further extensions only with the written consent of the
commercial landlord. While the initial time period was doubled,
Congress definitively took control away from DIPs.46 Absent consent
of a commercial landlord, DIPs now have a maximum of 210 days
(roughly seven months) 47 from the date of filing to make the assumption
or rejection decision.48 Practice under the prior law allowed deferring




42. H.R. REP. No. 109-3 1, pt. 1, at 86 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 152-53.
43. Hatch, supra note 35, at 6-7.
44. Id. ("The current Code permits a retail debtor as long as years to decide what it will
do with its leases. This legislation ... acts to curb this abuse.").
45. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, § 404(a).
46. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 86 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 152-53;
Hatch, supra note 35, at 6-7 ("Beyond that maximum period, there is no authority to grant
further time unless the lessor has agreed in writing to the extension.").
47. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (120 day initial decision period plus a
single ninety day extension equals 210 days, or roughly seven months).
48. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 86 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 152-53;
Hatch, supra note 35, at 6-7 ("Beyond that maximum period, there is no authority to grant
384 (Vol. 10
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the assumption or rejection decision up to the point of plan
confirmation. 49  The revised law substantially reduces that period,
presumably leading to faster decisions and increasing the level of
certainty for landlords that was envisioned by Congress when it added §
365(d)(4) two decades ago.50
For many proponents the revisions to § 365(d)(4) were long
overdue.51 As was testified to by a representative from the International
Council of Shopping Centers before the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and The Courts, "[t]oday,
we are faced with a bankruptcy system and process that is vastly
different than what Congress envisioned," and "this legislation
represents a common sense approach to balancing the needs of debtors
and creditors during business reorganizations." 52 Others remain
strongly opposed, arguing that while the prior law may have provided
"an inordinate amount of time to determine whether a location was
viable, it did allow for an orderly and studied approach to rehabilitating
companies in bankruptcy."53
III. IMPACT OF REVISED § 365(d)(4) ON THE LENDING WORLD
The revisions to § 365(d)(4) will undoubtedly alter the way a
DIP deals with assumption and rejection of its unexpired leases of
further time unless the lessor has agreed in writing to the extension.").
Whether landlords will consent to further extensions or not will almost
certainly be a function of the relevant lease market at the time the
decision has to be made. If the lease is at a below-market rent in a
market where alternative tenants are available, there is no reason for
consent to be provided because the landlord would have the opportunity
to find a new tenant at a higher rent. Conversely, if the lease is at or
above the market, consent would likely be given (if requested) in the
interests of certainty.
Reimer, supra note 6.
49. Reimer, supra note 6; Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 6, at 623.
50. See BROWN & AHERN III, supra note 3, at 97 (2005); infra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Testimony of Ellen B. Marshal, supra note 35.
52. Id.
53. Restructuring Pros Find Little To Like In Revisions To Bankruptcy Code, 107 Bus.
CREDIT 30, Iss. 8 (Sept. 1, 2005); see also Business Bankruptcy Reform Act: Business
Bankruptcy Issues in Review: Hearing on S. 1914 Before Subcomm. on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (May 19, 1998)
[hereinafter Testimony of H. Elizabeth Baird] (testimony of H. Elizabeth Baird, Senior
Counsel NationsBank Corp., American Bankers Association).
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nonresidential real property. 4 In some cases, forcing a DIP to decide
by a strict deadline, without the possibility of further extension, may
drive up the amount of cash required immediately upon filing for
bankruptcy.55 This may benefit DIP lenders by requiring larger DIP
financing to meet a DIP's immediate cash needs.56 On the other hand,
requiring DIPs to borrow more cash up front may imperil the
reorganization's success, to the possible detriment of DIP lenders.57
A. Opportunities for DIP lenders under revised § 365(d)(4)
Adequate DIP financing is the lifeblood for most debtors
attempting to reorganize and rehabilitate their business. 58 DIP financing
may come from either a prior lender, secured or unsecured, or from a
lender not involved with the borrower prior to bankruptcy.59 Statutory
authority for a DIP to obtain credit and incur debt in order to operate the
business while bankrupt is found in § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code.6 ° In
54. Reimer, supra note 6.
55. See Marcia 1. Goldstein & Victoria Vron, Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations,
Current Issues in Debtor in Possession Financing, SK092 ALI-ABA 115, 149 (June 9-11,
2005) ("In essence, the 2005 Act increases the cash requirements for DIPs, both shortly after
the date of filing of the petition and upon the effective date of the plan of reorganization.");
Erik Moser, How The New Bankruptcy Law May Affect Troubled Companies, Capital Eyes
E-newsletter (Bank of America) (Sept. 2005), http://www.bofabusinesscapital.com
/resources/capeyes/a09-05-302.html ("The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act is likely to increase the amount of cash a company needs upon filing for
bankruptcy.").
56. Moser, supra note 55 ("[Tlhis extra cash requirement will mean bigger DIP
commitments .... "); see also Goldstein & Vron, supra note 55, at 149.
57. See Reimer, supra note 6; Goldstein & Vron, supra note 55, at 149; Moser, supra
note 55.
58. E.g., Marcia L. Goldstein, Michele J. Meises & Timothy Graulich, Current Issues
In Debtor In Possession Financing, 867 PLI/Comm 251, 253 (Oct. 2004); In re Ames Dep't
Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Most successful reorganizations
require the debtor in possession to obtain new financing simultaneously with or soon after
the commencement of the Chapter 11 case."); Moser, supra note 55 ("Debtor-in-possession
(DIP) financing is a lifeline for many bankrupt companies .... ); David A. Skeel, The Past,
Present, and Future of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905, 1906,
1934 n.5 (2004) (citing that in 1996, 48.21% of publicy held debtors who filed for
bankruptcy obtained DIP financing).
59. See Jon M. Labovitz, Taking A Fresh Look At DIP Budgeting, 24 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 34, 34 (March 2005) (acknowledging that DIP financing typically comes from the same
lenders or syndicate of lenders of the debtor prepetition); Goldstein, Meises & Graulich,
supra note 58, at 274-76 (outlining a number of ways a debtor may receive DIP financing
through entities other than a bank).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a)-(d) (2000).
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fact, to promote the paramount goal of reorganization and rehabilitation
of the bankrupt entity, the Bankruptcy Code provides numerous
protections and incentives to encourage lenders to provide DIP
financing.6' Under § 364(a) and (b), a DIP lender has the potential to
receive administrative priority among all unsecured claims when
extending unsecured credit. 6 If a DIP is unable to obtain financing
under § 364(a) or (b), § 364(c) and (d) provide a DIP lender with a
"superpriority" administrative expense claim, superior to all other
administrative priority claims, and possibly a security interest in the
assets of the DIP.63 While powerful incentives to become a DIP lender
already exist under § 364, the revisions to § 365(d)(4) may provide
additional incentives. 64
When a debtor files for protection under Chapter 11, the debtor
is typically not current on all lease obligations.65 In some instances
these claims accumulate to significant dollar amounts and commercial
landlords are eager to receive payment.66 Upon filing for bankruptcy,
however, collection of prepetition payments are subject to the automatic
stay under § 362(a), halting the collection efforts of all creditors,
including commercial landlords.67
At this point, if a DIP chooses to assume a lease, the DIP must
make good on all past-due monetary lease obligations, commonly
known as cure payments.68 With the unlimited time period DIPs
61. Goldstein, Meises & Graulich, supra note 58, at 253-56 (citing § 364 as the main
incentive to loan to a DIP).
62. § 364(a)-(b). The DIP lender who extends unsecured credit will receive
administrative expense priority "allowable under Section 503(b)(1) of this title." Id.
63. § 364(c)-(d). To receive this high priority the debtor will have to demonstrate to the
court that financing on more favorable terms is unavailable. See, e.g., In re Shaw Indus.,
Inc., 300 B.R. 861, 863 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. 2003) (noting debtor's "significant efforts to obtain
alternative financing," which included contacting "numerous lenders, both institutions and
individuals").
64. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Walnut Properties, Inc., 119 Cal. App. 4th 293, 296, 14
Cal. Rptr. 3d 369, 372 (noting that Walnut Properties' unpaid rent totaled over $1 million);
Company News; Wang Seeks Court's Permission To Terminate Leases, supra note 11
("Wang Laboratories Inc., said it would ask the Federal Bankruptcy Court for authority to
terminate more than 115 unexpired leases for various operations throughout the United
States, which would save it $35 million in annual rental expenses.").
66. Id.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000) (providing that a voluntary, joint or involuntary petition
for bankruptcy operates as a stay, applicable to all entities).
68. § 365(b)(1) (providing that in the event of a default, the trustee may not assume the
lease unless the default is cured). On the other hand, if the lease is rejected either by
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typically enjoyed under the previous § 365(d)(4) to decide whether to
assume or reject unexpired leases, DIPs were able to wait until
confirmation of the plan of reorganization and its accompanying exit
loan facility to satisfy cure payments.69 If a DIP could postpone the
assumption decision until plan confirmation, no money was needed for
cure payments until that time.7°
This practice may continue for debtors with a relatively small
number of unexpired leases to handle when filing for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 11. 7 ' A 210-day decision period is ample time
to assume a small number of leases in conjunction with plan
confirmation. 72 However, for larger, national chains, with dozens or
even hundreds of unexpired leases of nonresidential real property, this
old practice will quickly erode.73 The shorter, stricter overall time
period to assume or reject unexpired leases may add to the immediate
cash needs of a DIP in order to effectuate the reorganization and
rehabilitation of its business. 4 If a DIP intends to assume certain leases
within the maximum 210-day decision period (absent commercial
landlord consent to an extension) and the plan of reorganization and its
accompanying exit loan facility are still far from complete, the money
for cure payments must come from another source.75 The need to fund
larger cure payments before a final plan of reorganization is effectuated
will often increase the amount of DIP financing required when a DIP
files for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 1 1.76 This is where larger
DIP loans will be required, and thus, where the opportunity is created
election or default, the commercial landlord has a general unsecured prepetition claim on
both the unpaid rent and the remaining lease obligation. § 502(g). Regardless of the
decision that is made, the DIP is required to pay for the post-petition pre-rejection period
while bankrupt. § 365(d)(3).
69. See Moser, supra note 55.
70. See id.
71. Cf Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 6, at 623-24.
72. Cf id.
73. Cf Moser, supra note 55; Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 6, at 623-24.
74. Goldstein & Vron, supra note 55, at 149 ("In essence, the 2005 Act increases the
cash requirements for DIPs, both shortly after the date of filing of the petition and upon the
effective date of the plan of reorganization."); Moser, supra note 55 ("[T]he Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act is likely to increase the amount of cash a
company needs upon filing for bankruptcy.").




for increased lending with unsecured, and possibly secured,
administrative priority."
B. DIP lender beware: potential pitfalls in lending under revised §
3 65(d) (4)
While the opportunity to make larger loans to DIPs with
administrative priority has presented itself through the revisions to §
365(d)(4), lenders may want to seize it cautiously.78 Conforming to the
stricter time period under revised § 365(d)(4) will likely increase the
pressure on a DIP to make their assumption or rejection decision.79 In
some instances, this increased pressure may force DIPs to make a
number of improvident assumption decisions,80 after which commercial
landlords will be on an equal playing field with DIP lenders with
respect to administrative priority, which could possibly imperil the
success of the reorganization. 8'
In the ordinary course of a Chapter 11 case, DIPs are to be
expected to make the decision to reject leases clearly unlikely to
succeed.82 However, because the revisions to § 365(d)(4) require a DIP
to make a decision about its leases within an overall shorter amount of
time, DIPs may unwisely choose to keep leases that are marginally
promising.83 If a DIP decides to assume a marginally promising lease
and is later unable to maintain the monetary lease obligation, the DIP is
77. See supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 79-102 and accompanying text.
79. See Goldstein & Vron, supra note 55, at 149 ("As a result of this change, many
debtors will be forced into making premature decisions on lease
assumption/rejection ... "); Peter Edmonston, Now, the Bad News, DAILY DEAL, May 9,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 7172254 ("You'd better be making the right decision the
first time."); BROWN & AHERN III, supra note 3, at 98 ("This new timeline is designed to
focus the judge's attention on the interests of landlords and, over the course of the
bankruptcy process, to increase the pressure on the tenant.").
80. Reimer, supra note 11.
81. See infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text; BROWN & AHERN III, supra note 3,
at 97 (explaining that the new revisions will "level the playing field" for landlords and
lenders).
82. Cf Levin & Ranny-Marinelli, supra note 11, at 623-24; Reimer, supra note 11.
83. Edmonston, supra note 79 ("[M]anagement is usually going to push to keep the
marginal stores open .. "). The problem, of course, is that pushing to keep the marginal
stores open is often what caused the bankruptcy in the first place. Id. See also Levin &
Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 11, at 623-24.
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then forced to subsequently reject the lease. 84 The result of an
improvident, possibly premature, assumption decision is the creation of
an administrative expense claim for the commercial landlord85 which
the DIP must pay before it can exit bankruptcy.8 6 The landlord's claim
receives the same priority DIP lenders get when lending to DIPs under §
364(b). 87 Thus, unless a DIP lender is protected by a superpriority
administrative expense claim under § 364(c) or (d),88 the commercial
landlord will be on an equal playing field with the DIP lender when the
DIP initially assumes and then subsequently rejects a lease.89
Prior to the enactment of the 2005 Act, courts typically allowed
administrative expense claims for subsequent lease rejection on a dollar-
for-dollar basis, meaning that a DIP was burdened by the full monetary
amount of the lease obligation that remained due to the landlord.90 In
apparent anticipation of forced assumption decisions that may lead to
subsequent rejections, Congress added § 503(b)(7) to the section of
allowable administrative expenses.91 As a result of this addition, courts
are no longer able to grant landlords administrative priority for the full
amount of all monetary lease obligations.92 The administrative priority
for such a claim is capped at the sum of all monetary obligations due
under the lease for the two-year period following the rejection date or
actual turnover of the premises, whichever is later.93 If any monetary
84. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (2000) (stating that if the lease is deemed rejected, either by
operation of the statute or by election, the "trustee shall immediately surrender such
nonresidential real property to the lessor").
85. Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 11, at 624; see also In re Klein Sleep
Products, Inc., 78 F.3d 18, 23-28 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an assumed lease which is
later rejected receives administrative priority status).
86. § 1129(a)(9) (stating that priority claims must be paid in full before leaving
bankruptcy).
87. See supra notes 58-63, 82-86 and accompanying text.
88. § 364(c)-(d); see infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 58-88 and accompanying text. The DIP lender's administrative
expense claim is created by financing the DIP with unsecured credit in bankruptcy, while
the commercial landlords' is created by the subsequent rejection of a previously assumed
lease by the DIP. See supra notes 58-88 and accompanying text.
90. Goldstein & Vron, supra note 55, at 149. The lease obligation the nondebtor party
was entitled to included both the prepetition lease obligation as well as the postpetition lease
obligation. See In re Norwegian Health Spa, 79 B.R. 507 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 1987); In re
Mushroom Transportation Co., 78 B.R. 754 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1987).





obligations remain under the lease after the allowable two-year period,
they become a general unsecured prepetition claim under the calculation
set forth in § 502(b)(6).94 While this may seem to be a positive addition
for DIP lenders by limiting what was once an unlimited claim,
commercial landlords will remain equally ranked with DIP lenders who
lend under § 364(b) in the administrative priority line as to the
allowable portion of the lease obligation claim.95 With respect to large,
national chains who hold a significant number of leases, the rent amount
could equal, if not be greater than, the DIP loan itself, even if the
landlord's claim is capped at two years' rent payments.96
Additionally, improvident assumption decisions by a DIP may
not only lead to subsequent rejection, but also to multiple administrative
expense claims that may have a cumulative effect of triggering
liquidation. 9' If a Chapter 7 liquidation ensues and commercial
landlords are on an equal playing field with DIP lenders with respect to
their administrative expense claims, DIP lenders may be forced to
compete with commercial landlords over whose administrative claim
receives priority in a liquidation proceeding. 98 If the success of the
reorganization could be imperiled in this manner, lenders may want to
rethink large DIP loans for fear of significant opposing administrative
expense claims in a subsequent liquidation.99 Conversion to a Chapter 7
case, however, would mean that the priority established for Chapter 11
administrative expense claims would no longer be honored with priority,
as the Chapter 11 claims would become subordinated to the priority
claims of the Chapter 7 case. 00 In light of the fact that "less than ten
percent of businesses filing in Chapter 11 ever successfully confirm a
reorganization plan,"' ' DIP lenders may want to rethink making large
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Company News; Wang Seeks Court's Permission To Terminate Leases,
supra note 11 ("Wang Laboratories Inc., said it would ask the Federal Bankruptcy Court for
authority to terminate more than 115 unexpired leases for various operations throughout the
United States, which would save it $35 million in annual rental expenses.").
97. Reimer, supra note 6; see also Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 6, at 624.
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2000).
99. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
100. In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 134 B.R. 4, 6-7 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
administrative expenses of a Chapter 7 case have priority over superpriority administrative
claims from the superseded Chapter 11 case).
101. Testimony of H. Elizabeth Baird, supra note 53 (finding by the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission in 1994); see also Rosemary Williams, Time Limits on
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DIP loans to DIPs with significant commercial lease obligations, or at
least requiring a significantly greater risk premium for those DIPs who
could pose higher risk than others (e.g., retailers).
10 2
IV.WHAT CAN DIP LENDERS DO TO PROTECT THEIR POSTPETITION
INTERESTS WHEN LENDING UNDER § 364(b)?
Unless DIP lenders take the proper steps to protect their
interests at the right time, they may find themselves facing several
significant opposing administrative expense claims from commercial
landlords in the event a DIP prematurely assumes a lease and
subsequently rejects it while in bankruptcy.0 3 Whether prepetition or
pre-DIP financing, a lender may require borrowers to do several things
before extending credit, while at the same time adding more factors to
an already extensive risk analysis, in order to reduce the number of
opposing administrative expense claims encountered postpetition.
10 4
Because DIP lenders are typically also the prepetition lenders
with significant bargaining power at the initial loan stage, DIP lenders
may be able to protect their postpetition position up front.10 5 Those
prepetition lenders who may eventually become DIP lenders should
provide for the unfortunate event of a bankruptcy in the original loan
agreement by requiring thorough prepetition planning by the borrower
prior to filing for bankruptcy. 0 6 If a good plan of reorganization is
Assumption or Rejection on Executory Contract or Lease Under § 365 of Bankruptcy Code
(11 US.C. § 365), 137 A.L.R. Fed. 137, § 3(a) (1997) ("Only a small percentage of the
rehabilitative cases filed every year result in confirmation and consummation of a plan.").
But see EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 734-35 ("[T]he Chapter 11 of a big business usually leads
to some form of reorganization of the company that is 'successful' at least in the sense that
some part of the business continues as a going concern.").
102. Cf Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 11, at 624.
103. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 105-119 and accompanying text.
105. See Labovitz, supra note 59, at 34 (acknowledging that DIP financing typically
comes from the same lenders or syndicate of lenders of the debtor prepetition); Goldstein,
Meises & Graulich, supra note 58, at 274-76 (outlining a number of ways a debtor may
receive DIP financing through entities other than a bank).
106. Edmonston, supra note 79 ("It's possible the lease decisions would have to be made
before a reorganization plan even exists."); Katherine Clayton, North Carolina Bankers
Association Legal Memorandum, Business Provisions - The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Vol. 37, No. 12 (Oct. 26, 2005) ("The changes
require debtors to do more advance planning prior to filing for bankruptcy... [and] there
may be more pre-packaged bankruptcy filings. ); Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra
note 55, at 624-25 ("Clearly, the new statute will require careful prebankruptcy
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formulated prior to filing for bankruptcy, or can at least be completed
within the 210-day decision period to either assume or reject unexpired
leases, many premature assumption decisions by a DIP can be avoided
entirely, and commercial landlords' administrative expense claims may
never arise.'07
If a DIP lender was also the prepetition lender, at either the
prepetition or pre-DIP financing phase, it may also require the borrower
to obtain written landlord consent to waive and/or subordinate any
administrative expense claim it may have in bankruptcy. 108 This
consent form has the practical effect of subordinating the commercial
landlord's administrative expense claim to the DIP lender's
administrative expense claim, in the event the two parties compete for
priority.'0 9 However, with the increased ability of commercial landlords
to control the pace of a Chapter 11 proceeding by forcing assumption or
rejection within a shorter time period under revised § 365(d)(4), no
incentive may exist for commercial landlords to consent to such a
request, either prepetition or postpetition." The leverage wielded by
commercial landlords under the revised § 365(d)(4) may leave
unsecured DIP lenders who were also prepetition lenders with no
recourse, or at least no way to place their interests above that of the
commercial landlords'.'
If a DIP lender is not in a position to protect itself in the
prepetition phase of lending, it may still lend under the more favorable §
364(c) and (d) in order to protect its postpetition interests, which would
give the DIP lender a superpriority administrative expense claim." 2 To
receive a superpriority administrative expense claim under § 364(c) or
(d), a DIP must demonstrate to the bankruptcy court that financing on
planning ... ").
107. See supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text. If the DIP does not make any
improvident assumption decisions in regards to unexpired leases because of a well thought
out plan of reorganization, the commercial landlord will not have any claim rising to the
level of administrative priority. See supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text. Thus, the
commercial landlord would not be competing with the DIP lender, as the commercial
landlord would have no administrative priority claim and the DIP lender would. See supra
notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
108. See Goldstein, Meises & Graulich, supra note 58, at 258-59 (acknowledging that
waivers have been, and continue to be, used to waive debtor rights).
109. See id.
110. Cf Reimer, supra note 6.
111. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)-(d) (2000).
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more favorable terms is unavailable."l 3 If the DIP is successful in
convincing the court of its need for superpriority lending, the DIP
lender will then be above all unsecured administrative expense claims,
including the commercial landlords', and will no longer need to worry
about competing for priority.' 
14
Being cognizant of the newly created risks and rewards
associated with lending to a DIP under the revised § 365(d)(4) may be
the most important factor to consider in evaluating whether or not to
lend at all." 5 While the prepetition lender may theoretically require a
borrower to take steps prepetition to ensure a successful reorganization
and thus DIP lender priority, reality may dictate otherwise." 6 Today,
more money is at stake with the likelihood of many competing
administrative expense claims from improvident assumption decisions
and the possibility of forced liquidation." 7 Without any real safeguard
to protect against these risks, DIP lenders must realize what they are
getting themselves into from the outset and have confidence in the
business to which it will lend." 8 Otherwise, DIP lenders may be taking
unnecessary risks in lending to a potentially liquidating company." 9
V. CONCLUSION
The revisions to § 365(d)(4) are obviously favorable for
commercial landlords who have often waited years for a determination
whether their leases would be assumed or rejected. 2 ° Not so obvious,
however, is whether or not DIP lenders will experience benefits from
these revisions.' 2 ' Lending to a DIP is already attractive with the built-
113. E.g., In re Shaw Indus., Inc., 300 B.R. 861, 863 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003) (noting
debtor's "significant efforts to obtain alternative financing," which included contacting
"numerous lenders, both institutions and individuals").
114. Compare § 364(a)-(b) with § 364(c)-(d).
115. See Goldstein & Vron, supra note 55, at 149.
116. See infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
118. DIP Financing:Breathing New Life Into Ailing Companies, Capital Eyes E-
newsletter (Bank of America) (Feb. 2003), http://www.bofabusinesscapital.com
/resources/capeyes/a02-03-148.html ("Just as important as cash is confidence."); see also
supra notes 103-117 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
120. See Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 6, at 624; Jones, supra note 32.
121. See supra notes 54-102 and accompanying text.
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in incentive of administrative priority, 12 2 but with a shorter time period
for debtors to decide whether to assume or reject an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property, a debtor's cash needs upon filing for
bankruptcy may rise dramatically. 123 In turn, DIP lenders must rise to
the occasion, accounting for these increased needs of debtors upon
filing for bankruptcy with the same advantage of administrative
priority.
124
Before a DIP lender jumps into larger loans, however, it may
want to proceed cautiously. 125 With the revisions to § 365(d)(4), an
increasing number of debtors may find themselves making a number of
improvident assumption decisions leading to competing administrative
expense claims from commercial landlords. 126 As the number of
administrative expense claims rise from these forced assumption
decisions, so too does the possibility of subsequent liquidation. 127
Without any significant safeguard to protect the postpetition interests of
a DIP lender against competing administrative expense claims, and the
likelihood of subsequent liquidation, the lender must realize what type
of risks it is taking in lending to a debtor who has significant lease
obligations and must account for those risks in evaluating whether or
not to lend at all.
128
JORDAN M. KIRBY
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000).
123. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
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